The Human Capital-Intensive Firm and Coordination: Redefined Integration and Disintegration by Sautel, Olivier & Cézanne, Cécile
The Human Capital-Intensive Firm and Coordination:
Redefined Integration and Disintegration
Olivier Sautel, Ce´cile Ce´zanne
To cite this version:
Olivier Sautel, Ce´cile Ce´zanne. The Human Capital-Intensive Firm and Coordination: Rede-
fined Integration and Disintegration. 2007. <hal-00628647>
HAL Id: hal-00628647
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00628647
Submitted on 3 Oct 2011
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
The Human Capital–Intensive Firm and Coordination: 
Redefined Integration and Disintegration 
 
 
by 
OLIVIER SAUTEL AND CECILE CEZANNE 
 
 
 
 
The aim of this paper is to reconsider the link between integration and 
disintegration. We argue that the conception of this link depends on 
the way one defines the firm and its coordinating role. We focus on 
studying the human capital-intensive firm. We explain that 
coordination by this kind of firms consists in coordinating productive 
tasks. The role of the firm is to coordinate the specialization of 
complementary resources and the division of labour. We show that 
integration and disintegration must be differentiated by the tools they 
give to the firm to effectively govern productive assets. (JEL: D23, 
L22, L23) 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Vertical integration is one of the main issues of the analysis of industrial organization. In an 
historical perspective, the literature has often put the emphasis on successive movements of 
vertical integration and disintegration (CHANDLER, 1977; LANGLOIS, 2003)1. This tendency to 
historically contrast integration with disintegration can be explained in an analytical way. 
Since the seminal work of COASE [1937] on the existence and the nature of the firm, many 
economists have interpreted the link between integration and disintegration as the consensual 
opposition between hierarchy and market (WILLIAMSON, 1975, 1985; KLEIN ET AL., 1978). 
Economists describe integration and disintegration as alternative means to coordinate 
productive activities. In an institutional perspective, the division of labour is ensured, on the 
one hand, by hierarchies, and by the price system, on the other hand. Integration and 
disintegration are the two polar modes of coordinating economic agents. The perception of 
vertical disintegration as the analytical opposite of integration is based on the vision of the 
firm as a combination of physical assets commonly owned. As modelled by the Incomplete 
Contracts Theory, the ownership of physical assets determines a planed coordination by firms 
whereas the non-ownership corresponds to a spontaneous coordination by markets. 
 
The traditional theory of the firm based on the property rights perspective as formalized by 
HART AND MOORE [1990] and HART [1995] can be criticized by taking into account the 
importance of human assets in the production process of firms (RAJAN AND ZINGALES, 2000; 
ROBERTS AND VAN DEN STEEN, 2000; MINEFI, 2005). BLAIR [1995, p. 292] states “a 
knowledge company’s primary resource and principal competitive advantage is the 
knowledge that its employees possess …”. Abilities, skills and knowledge developed both by 
internal workers and external stakeholders of the firm characterize a significant corporate 
                                                 
1 During a same period, the thesis of massive adoption of a unique organizational form has been criticized by 
LAMOREAUX ET AL. [2003]. These authors explain that the modes of vertical organization do vary from firm to 
firm and from industry to industry. 
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added value of innovative strategies of the productive entity. For example, business services 
firms in data-processing and in telecommunications produce 72% of the added-value of the 
French sector of Information and Communication Technologies (SESSI, 2005). It indicates 
that firms built around agents’ resources produce 72% of the added-value of the sector. By 
comparison, the production of computers represents only 3% of the added value of the same 
industry. These data suggest that human capital-intensive firms tend to be more and more 
important in economic activity. 
 
The aim of this paper is to re-consider the link between vertical integration and disintegration 
on the basis of an understanding of modes of coordination within the human capital-intensive 
firm. 
 
We focus on analyzing entrepreneurial firms whose productive activity is built around the 
human capital of its key partners. One can say this case is a restrictive one but we believe it 
concerns numerous firms. Especially, it concerns business service firms. 
On the basis of an original vision of the human-capital-intensive firm, we suggest a new 
definition of the relationship between integration and disintegration, overcoming the 
traditional dichotomic vision. A change in the central subject of coordination (human assets 
rather than physical assets) involves reconsidering modalities of coordination (specialization 
of tasks rather than property of assets). It thus involves re-examining the link between 
integration and disintegration (integration and disintegration are not viewed as two opposite 
institutional modes of coordination). We argue that integration and disintegration must be 
differentiated by the tools they give to the firm so that it can effectively govern the productive 
specialization of its human assets. 
 
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the dichotomic conception of the 
link between vertical integration and disintegration. The alternative “hierarchy/market” as the 
mode of coordination is based on a vision of the firm exclusively defined as a structure of 
property rights. Section 3 questions the relevance of this vision developed by the Incomplete 
Contracts Theory by examining the problem of coordination in a human capital-intensive 
firm. The hierarchical organization, power stakes and the model of governance of a firm 
based on its human assets lies on the management of the specialization of agents rather than 
the allocation of property rights. On the basis of this enriched vision of the coordinating role 
of the human capital-intensive firm, we propose in section 4 a new analysis of integration and 
disintegration. We conclude that the relationship between integration and disintegration must 
be understood as a combination of instruments available to a unique mode of coordination, 
the specialization of agents within the functional boundaries of the firm. 
 
 
2 The Firm as a Legal Structure of Property Rights 
 
2.1 Questioning the Foundations of Contractual Theories of the Firm 
 
Scholars have long ignored the firm as a very important agent of the economic analysis. They 
focused on studying market and described it as the only and optimal mode of coordination of 
economic activities. The seminal article of COASE [1937] bases the existence of the firm on 
market informational imperfections. And Coase justifies the superiority of the firm by 
emphasizing the price system fails to coordinate effectively economic activities. Economic 
institutions, like corporations, would be able to save some transaction costs due to productive 
activities (COASE, 1937; WILLIAMSON, 1975, 1985). Besides, the tendency of firms to create 
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market value through productive transactions matters as far as two dimensions are concerned. 
The surplus-sharing, on the one hand, and uncertainty concerning the realization of this 
surplus, on the other hand, are the two main problems arising from the productive activity of 
firms. 
 
Later research (GROSSMAN AND HART, 1986; HART AND MOORE, 1990) explains transactions 
costs are due to a problem of strategic expropriation of relational quasi-rents: this is the so 
called hold-up risk induced by underinvestments. The Incomplete Contracts Theory focuses 
on efficiency considerations and incentives structures to deal with hold-up problems. More 
precisely, the Incomplete Contracts Theory comes down to two main assumptions: 
– The coordination of two agents in a productive transaction amounts to a problem of 
incentives; what only matters is how to encourage agents to make efforts and how to solve 
the corresponding hold-up problem; 
– The hold-up problem can be overcome by giving the set of residual rights of control to a 
unique agent. This solution supposes this agent legally appropriates the assets of the firm. 
In other words, the firm is defined as a combination of assets legally and commonly 
owned. 
The Incomplete Contracts Theory considers ownership as the way to address potential hold-
ups and incentives alignment in a world of incomplete contracting and divergent interests 
(HOLMSTROM AND ROBERTS, 1998). 
 
In this context, vertical integration is associated with a need of planed coordination in the 
production process. Vertical integration is the organizational solution to buffer hold-up 
threats. Reciprocally, vertical disintegration can be viewed as a spontaneous coordination by 
markets where assets remain separately owned. The analytical link between vertical 
integration and disintegration is considered in a bipolar way: sometimes the firm, sometimes 
the market, is privileged in order to coordinate industrial activities. 
 
This analysis seems not to be pertinent in regard to the current industrial context. The last 
twenty years have been characterized by a large movement of vertical disintegration 
(LANGLOIS, 2003; LEIBLEIN AND MILLER, 2003). Many stages of the production process are 
outsourced so that inter-firms relationships have greatly and rapidly increased. In 2003, 81% 
of French firms of more than 20 employees declared keeping up at least one cooperation 
relationship; 70% of these firms communicated that this kind of relationships was durable 
(more than five years) (SESSI, 2005). Besides, inter-firms relationships have changed in the 
way companies are linked. A lot of work on the emergence of the network-firm testifies the 
recent growth of market relations (LANGLOIS, 2003; BAUDRY, 2004; FRIGANT, 2005). Yet, 
disintegration does not necessarily correspond to a new development of anonymous and 
spontaneous market relationships. Industrial restructuring has come with a strengthening of 
the influence of leader firms in the economic system. This monopolization process does not 
suggest a return of market coordination; it rather highlights the structuring role of big firms in 
the organization of markets. 
 
This apparent “paradox” can be understood by re-founding the nature and the role of the firm. 
More precisely, we must go beyond the vision of the firm as a combination of fixed assets 
commonly owned. In this perspective, we can overcome the traditional dichotomic conception 
of the relationship between vertical integration and disintegration. We propose to explain 
integration and disintegration as two different modalities of a same coordination process 
controlled by the firm. To do so, we show that the firm effectively governs its productive 
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activity and actively organizes the division of tasks with different tools given by vertical 
integration and disintegration. 
 
Two perspectives can be explored to develop this argument by questioning the two main 
assumptions stated above. 
First, the contractual problem of rents expropriation is not the only one. The historical 
controversy around General Motors – Fisher Body case (COASE, 2000; KLEIN, 2000; 
FREELAND, 2000; CASADESUS-MASANELL AND SPULBER, 2000) illustrates, for example, that 
vertical integration is especially chosen in order to coordinate the production process. The 
contractual aspect is of secondary importance in the choice of vertical integration. For 
Christensen, VERLINDEN AND WESTERMAN [2002], the choice of the institutional form 
depends on a need of explicit technological coordination between agents. This choice varies 
with the degree of innovation of the goods produced. As a result, questioning the first 
assumption stated above corresponds to an external criticism of the Incomplete Contracts 
Theory. The coordination challenge is not a problem of incentives alignment. The nature of 
the coordination problem must be revised. Yet, this line of attack is not the issue of this paper. 
Next, the second assumption can be critically examined but in an internal way. The hold-up 
problem and more globally investments incentives issues are recognized as central questions. 
It is however possible to discuss that the firm, as a set of physical assets under common 
ownership, is up to solve these problems. This is the argumentation of MASKIN AND TIROLE 
[1999]: without referring to the firm, complete private contracts can be re-established to 
ensure incentives alignment. In this context, there’s no raison d’être to the firm. 
The internal criticism can be addressed in another way. In this paper, we suggest that the firm 
is the solution to the hold-up problem but not as a unified structure of property rights. The 
role of the firm is obviously to regulate the hold-up problem but in a different way, on the 
basis of an active and enriched coordination of the specialization of agents. This conception 
of the coordinating role of the firm results from dealing with the management of human assets 
in a contractual theory of the firm. 
 
2.2 Rethinking the Hold-Up Problem: the Importance of Specific Human Capital 
 
In the contractual framework, the hierarchy is a solution to the hold-up problem, given the 
opportunistic nature of human actors and the specificity of fixed assets required for efficient 
production. As an authority of coordination, the firm motivates agents who take part in the 
productive activity. However, the contractual framework focuses on the notion of ownership 
of physical and transferable assets. Such an approach of the firm argues away the possibility 
of a hold-up based on human capital, because of hypotheses which seem questionable. 
In the Incomplete Contracts Theory, the power due to the existence of specific human assets 
affects neither the design of incentives systems nor the coordination of productive activities. 
Therefore, the Incomplete Contracts Theory overshadows the assumption of a hold-up 
problem arising from human assets. It takes into account the human dimension but in a very 
restrictive way. Human assets are always subordinated to the development of physical assets. 
For example, the transfer of physical assets necessarily induces the transfer of human assets. 
Corporate knowledge does not depend on a unique individual but on a set of partners (KLEIN, 
1991). In this context, the problem of quasi-rents expropriation arising from human capital 
disappears via the assumption of knowledge dispersion. 
 
Moreover, when property rights on physical capital are reallocated, the control of human 
capital is indirectly but concomitantly altered. The level of skills, abilities and competencies 
reached by employees necessarily depends on a fixed capital specific to the firm. It follows 
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that the possibility that a worker attempts to expropriate a part of organizational rents is ruled 
out. Human capital is only valuable when it is combined to a firm-specific physical asset. In 
this perspective, when property rights are redistributed, workers simultaneously “transfer” 
their specific human capital. Workers follow the reorganizing movement and carry on their 
productive effort in the same previous conditions. HART [1989] notes that control of physical 
capital can lead to control of human assets in the form of organizational capital. 
 
Yet, we believe it is difficult to subordinate the importance of human assets to physical assets. 
Competition has increased, technological change has been advancing at a stronger pace and 
finance has been made more widely available. In this context, innovation has gained 
momentum and has been facilitated. Innovation usually requires workers whose human 
capital is specialized and specific to the firm employing them. Indeed, innovation race is 
necessarily conducted by valuable human capital at each stage of the production process. In 
this dynamic perspective, human capital has become more central in the productive activity of 
firms. Moreover, the development of specific human assets is strategic because according to 
BLAIR [1995, P. 231] “much of the wealth-generating capacity of most modern firms is based 
on the skills and knowledge of the employees and the ability of the organization as a whole to 
put those skills to work for customers and clients”. And, the great ability of human capital to 
capture rents makes the traditional Incomplete Contracts Theory no longer tenable. Human 
capital takes on intrinsic importance, beyond its complementarities with physical capital. 
Thus, the way to control incentives relative to human capital does differ from the way to 
control incentives relative to physical one. 
 
In this paper, we propose to adapt the existing theory of the firm to an emblematic case of a 
human capital-intensive firm and to analyze the different methods developed to discipline 
human capital in this firm. Human capital, because of its immaterial and non-transferable 
nature, can be appropriated neither by the firm nor by any stakeholders in the firm. Indeed, 
referring to Grossman, Hart and Moore terminology, an agent can not promise his residual 
rights of control on his human capital to others through an incomplete contract for a long 
period. Human capital is not alienable so that contracts on its management do not give the 
same residual rights of control as contracts on physical capital. GIBBONS [2005] notes that two 
kinds of rights coexist: alienable rights on physical assets and inalienable rights on human 
assets. Therefore, human capital-intensive firms can not be satisfactorily defined in terms of 
structure of property rights. The focus on the theory of the firm must shift to studying the 
economic nature (and not the legal nature) of organizations (RAJAN AND ZINGALES, 2001). 
The vision of the firm as a combination of physical assets commonly owned must be 
abandoned for an improved conception of the firm based on the specialization of human 
assets. It is a question of reconsidering control and incentives mechanisms over assets critical 
to the productive activity of the firm. Thus, we analyse the coordination of human assets and 
the coordination of their complementarities by exploring the organization, the operating and 
the governance of the human capital-intensive firm. 
 
 
3 The Human Capital-Intensive Firm: Hierarchical Organization, Power Relationships 
and Corporate Governance 
 
3.1 The Critical Resource Theory: the Firm as a ‘Nexus of Specific Investments 
 
The human capital-intensive firm must be viewed as a set of specific and mutually dependant 
tangible and intangible resources. This approach refers to multiple developments, and inter 
6 
 
alia, the Resource-Based View of the firm (RUMELT, 1984; WERNERFELT, 1984; PRAHALAD 
AND HAMEL, 1990; PETERAF, 1993). PENROSE [1959] defines the firm as a core of capacities 
and unique resources. AOKI [1984] characterizes the organization as a long term combination 
of specific resources. However, RAJAN AND ZINGALES [1998, p. 405], developing the Critical 
Resource Theory, model the entity as ‘a collection of commonly owned critical resources, 
talents, and ideas, and also the people who have access to those resources’. More precisely, 
ZINGALES [2000, p. 1645] states that the firm represent a “web of specific investments built 
around a critical resource”. It would result from the combination of three distinct phenomena: 
power, access to resources and complementarity, which all correspond to original 
mechanisms crucial to understand the firm built around its key human assets. 
 
On the basis of the Critical Resource Theory, we present a simple vision of the hierarchical 
organization, the division of tasks and power relationships within an entrepreneurial human 
capital-intensive firm. A firm builds its productive activity on a critical resource owned by the 
entrepreneur. This resource is decisive for the firm insofar as it enhances the development of 
its production process. In addition, the critical resource is a source of power for the 
entrepreneur who possesses it. The entrepreneur can influence his employees’ human capital, 
and he acquires power through the control (not ownership) over his own resource. If we 
actually regard entrepreneur’s critical resource as a key human capital (talent, skills, etc.), 
economic power arises from an intangible and non-transferable capital non-imitable in an 
instantaneously way. In this situation, the hierarchical organization gets power thanks to the 
ability of the entrepreneur to cause an accumulation of specific investments. In order to reach 
this objective, the entrepreneur needs to control access to his critical resource and to build 
complementarities between his critical resource and employees’ human capital. Unlike the 
Incomplete Contracts Theory, no contract is signed on the allocation of property rights 
because we consider a firm whose production process is based on human capital. We argue 
that a non-contractual2 agreement is rather done by giving access to the critical resource of the 
firm. The entrepreneur provides specialized stakeholders with an access to the firm or to his 
critical resource (i.e. its human capital) so that they can get power if they specialize 
themselves. In fact, by investing in human capital, stakeholders get power because they 
become decisive in the activity of the firm. The entrepreneur assigns access rights so that 
stakeholders who get access to the critical resource have the possibility to use or to work with 
it (RAJAN AND ZINGALES, 1998). The regulation of access corresponds to a coordinating 
mechanism alternative to ownership. Considering a firm typically built around its human 
assets, access is provided either through an employment relationship or through a cooperation 
agreement3. Once co-specificity exists between specific human assets, specialized workers 
adjust their investments in order not to jeopardize the joint value they can create together. 
Consequently, as this situation makes them dependent on the entrepreneur, employees choose 
to realize firm-specific investments because they know their reward will be greater if they 
control the critical resource of the firm. Through regulated access, an entrepreneur can shape 
a nexus of specific investments capable of producing more than any competitor with a similar 
resource hardly starting the production process. Indeed, the web of specific investments, built 
over time, cannot be instantaneously reproduced. The more agents specialize, the more power 
                                                 
2 The regulation of access includes not only access rights to the critical resource, but also the cooperation of the 
person being specialized to. Moreover, the regulation of access is not only a momentary action but a process that 
cannot be continuously verified by courts (RAJAN AND ZINGALES [1998, p. 403]). 
3 The common (separate) ownership of assets is not viewed as the corollary of vertical integration 
(disintegration). Corollary, an employment relationship would correspond to integration and a cooperation 
relationship to disintegration. Analyzing the boundaries of the human capital-intensive firm involves considering 
the relevance of employment relationships vis-à-vis cooperation relationships with external stakeholders. 
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is maintained and increased so that at some point, the firm becomes the nexus of specific 
investments itself. The firm becomes the critical resource itself. Therefore, it can increase the 
value of the growth opportunities of the firm. 
 
In this framework, power comes from control over human capital critical for the production 
process of the firm. Control over immaterial and inalienable critical capital does not refer to 
ownership. Control over critical capital rather involves the possibility of using or working 
with it. The stakeholder who is granted access does not acquire an additional residual right of 
decision; he can enhance his value by specializing, that is, by being a crucial “factor” in the 
production process of the firm. Access represents a power stake for the different stakeholders. 
On the one hand, by giving access to his critical resource, the entrepreneur arbitrates his 
power. First, he improves market valorisation of the firm. The firm has a competitive 
advantage on its real and/or potential competitors. As a nexus of specific investments in 
human capital, it cannot be imitated instantaneously. Second, the entrepreneur enhances his 
power within the firm on the specialized employees. As he is the only agent to control the 
inalienable rights of control on his critical resource, the entrepreneur is the key element of the 
complementarity between human assets in the production process. Nevertheless, the 
entrepreneur looses some negotiation power by giving up a part of the control of the firm to 
stakeholders who are granted access to the critical resource. 
On the other hand, stakeholders who are granted access control the nexus of critical resources 
so that they multiply their outside opportunities. First, specialization provides employees with 
a potential additional value: by accumulating knowledge and competencies within the firm 
they worked, employees improve the outside value of their human capital. Specialized 
employees systematically enhance their outside value because human capital is more “re-
adjustable” than physical capital. For example, engines to paint cars cannot be transferred in a 
firm of the data-processing business service sector. Whereas, a computer scientist working 
within a business service firm can be employed in a company of the car industry, either in a 
similar position or for another job, without important losses of value. In fact, specialized 
human capital is adaptable. Yet, as human capital is non-reproducible instantaneously, it can 
be costly for specialized employees to value their human capital outside. There remain some 
costs of search for a new job, some costs relative to the supply of a weaker salary, or some 
costs of adaptation to the critical resource of the new firm that employs them (even if this firm 
has same characteristics as the previous one). In order to get back a high negotiation power 
within the new firm, employees must co-specialize to the members of the new production 
team. However, their investment efforts would be weaker thanks to the similar competences 
and capabilities and experience they have acquired in the first firm. Second, employees have 
also the residual right to leave the firm. By using and working with it, employees can control 
the critical resource of the entrepreneur. Control over the critical resource is de facto an 
economic source of power for central employees. This power generates in turn surplus that 
depends on the importance of firm-specific investments made. Thus, the regulation of access 
is a privileged means to promote specific investments. The regulation of access can be a more 
motivating mechanism and a superior mode of allocation of power than ownership in the 
particular case of the human capital-intensive firm. 
 
Whereas ownership legally associates physical assets to a firm, complementarities join human 
assets within a team production. More precisely, by controlling access over his critical 
resource, the entrepreneur has the power to set and manage the collection of productive 
factors of which emerge synergies (ALCHIAN AND DEMSETZ, 1972). The human capital-
intensive firm can be viewed as a team organization which supports productive specialization. 
Stakeholders federate their efforts and make their skills co-specialize in a team production. 
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Therefore, team work is essential in a firm considered as an authority of coordination. Indeed, 
via the regulation of access, synergies between employees arise from a team work where each 
stakeholder is decisive because of the specific investments he makes (BLAIR AND STOUT, 
1999; RAJAN AND ZINGALES, 2001). Moreover, a critical resource is all the more crucial it is 
combined to the individual capabilities of other team members who are engaged in a 
particular task (BLAIR, 1995, 1999). Control over critical resources depends on the recognition 
of this manifestation. 
 
The organization of the human capital-intensive firm and the corresponding allocation of 
power highlight potential conflicts of interest between stakeholders. Power relationships have 
to be controlled through an organizational mode of governance adapted to the human capital-
intensive firm. 
 
3.2 The Governance of the Human Capital-Intensive Firm: Main Objectives and Main 
Tools of Coordination 
 
Originally, corporate governance issues arise from the separation between ownership and 
control (BERLE AND MEANS, 1932). In our framework4, the separation between ownership and 
control is about time. First, ownership, i.e. the legal source of power, provides the 
entrepreneur with the right to determine access to the critical resource now and in the future. 
Indeed, as he owns the initial critical resource of the firm, he has some exclusive residual 
rights of control. The right to forbid some agents to use or work with resources is part of his 
rights of decision. Secondly, control only gives to the owner the right to determine current 
access. Then, control may temporarily enhance the economic power of the owner. Critical 
resources, that cannot be owned but only controlled, even for the time being, give the same 
residual rights of control as ownership does. Specialized workers are key agents who increase 
power by investing specifically in their human capital. 
Altogether, the structural organization of the firm and the internal division of labour are an 
expression of power relationships and found a model of governance of the human capital-
intensive firm: the owner of the critical resource does not need that other stakeholders 
excessively develop their human capital because they wish organizational rents will be 
protected. In a symmetric way, stakeholders search for enriching their tasks and for making 
firm-specific investments. By specializing and by accumulating knowledge and competencies, 
stakeholders make themselves indispensable in the firm and enhance their outside value. 
 
As the distinctive value of human capital-intensive firms comes from resources that cannot be 
easily appropriated, the boundaries of the firm are often altered. Stakeholders can leave the 
firm with their human capital; so they can leave the firm with a part of the firm. Specialized 
employees get a negotiation power through mutual dependencies they have created. 
Negotiation power relies on the ability of stakeholders to make firm-specific investments: the 
more internal and external stakeholders specifically invest, the more rents to share within the 
coalition will be significant. Moreover, the accumulation of power in the hands of many 
stakeholders deteriorates their investment behavior. In this context, the risk of hold-up is high 
and the organizational structure of the firm can be changed. By ensuring them an equitable 
and attractive rent-sharing, the entrepreneur encourages the stakeholders to continue investing 
in the future. Because the possibility of renegotiation jeopardizes long-term commitments, 
                                                 
4 In this paper, we analyse the case of an entrepreneurial firm based on its human assets. Results would 
approximately be the same in a managerial enterprise built around its human assets except the fact ownership 
and control would be assumed by two kinds of agents, shareholders, on the one hand, and managers, on the other 
hand. 
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growth prospects are crucial in making the promise of future rents credible. If growth 
prospects diminish, then key stakeholders may lose the incentives to specialize. These 
stakeholders may be encouraged to leave the firm, changing its organizational form. In other 
words, specialized stakeholders can expropriate a large fraction of the value of the firm by 
developing their outside opportunities5. 
As power and rents are not concentrated but diffused, even outside the legal boundaries of the 
firm (as is the case for subcontractors essential for the firm), the main objective of corporate 
governance is to protect the integrity of the firm. In fact, the major corporate governance 
problem comes down to “how to prevent conflicts among stakeholders from paralyzing or 
even destroying the firm” (ZINGALES [2000, p. 1648]). 
 
Capital structure can be used to motivate the owners of critical resources to go on making 
firm-specific investments. Outside equities can lock-in relationships between stakeholders so 
that the firm can appropriate a fraction of rents generated and can protect its long-term 
viability. The solution consists in associating key stakeholders (employees, suppliers, 
customers, etc.) to the financial capital structure of the firm (HEGE, 2001). The role of these 
funds would be to preserve the firm as a nexus of specific investments, by making 
stakeholders’ interests converge. This modality to govern within the firm would reduce 
potential sources of conflicts. Moreover, the generalized award of stock options to employees 
remains an important trend in corporate governance in order to compensate and thus in order 
to retain employees (HOLMSTROM AND KAPLAN, 2001; OYER AND SCHAEFER, 2005). While 
rights of control associated with ownership may have diminished, the role of ownership in 
coordinating stakeholders may have increased (RAJAN AND ZINGALES, 2000). Another 
privileged instrument of corporate governance could be a better board representation of 
decisive stakeholders (HILLMAN, KEIM AND LUCE, 2001). Finally, setting up a system of job 
rotation could reduce hold-up problems in the human capital-intensive firm (HALONEN-
AKATWIJUKA, 2004). 
 
As we focus on the human capital-intensive firm, investigations have to study mechanisms 
which give to the firm the power to motivate, to control, and to retain specific human capital 
in order to maximize its value. In the Critical Resource Theory, power comes from the control 
of critical resources within the firm. In these circumstances, the main objective is to provide 
stakeholders with incentives to continue their relationship with the firm so that the firm can 
get wealth indispensable for its productive activity. Thus, the governance of the human 
capital-intensive firm is based on a particular representation of the acquisition, the allocation 
and the exercise of power. Stakeholders are not only viewed as agents with divergent 
interests. Stakeholders are also and above all considered as complementary critical resources 
that enhance the value of the firm and ensure its durability. At the same time, such a 
“disciplinary” system of corporate governance (to control and to incite) is necessary for 
competitive firms to capture growth opportunities. 
 
As we admit that specific human capital is central in many firms, we have attempted to 
develop a revised survey of the nature and the governance of the human capital-intensive 
firm. This approach inspires a new perception of the relationship between vertical integration 
and disintegration. In fact, taking into account an enlarged coordinating role of the firm, we 
argue that integration and disintegration can be viewed as different ways for the firm to 
coordinate the specialization of agents. 
                                                 
5 This hold-up manifestation is significant because 71% of the firms recorded in the Inc 500 list would have 
been founded by talented employees that have imitated or only changed a growth opportunity built by the firm 
employing them before (BHIDE, 2000). 
10 
 
 
4 Revisiting the Relationship between Integration and Disintegration 
 
The vision we develop of the human capital-intensive organization highlights three 
characteristics of the coordinating role of the firm: 
– The role of the firm is rather an organizational role than a legal one. The power of the 
firm does not depend on its legal structure. It relies on the active capacity of the firm 
to organize the division of labour. The role of the firm consists in managing a whole 
combination of complementarities between knowledge, skills and capabilities. 
Actually, the firm does not only aim to deal with traditional hold-up problems; 
– The central role of the firm is to organize productive activities. Coordination within 
the firm does not only suppose that a unique agent holds all the residual rights of 
control. The firm requires a set of coordinating instruments in order to handle the 
specialization of agents; 
– The firm can extend its coordinating role to agents who work outside its legal 
boundaries. 
These three features are crucial to understand the nature of the link between vertical 
integration and disintegration. 
First, vertical disintegration must be viewed as an organizational choice. Vertical 
disintegration does not stand for mere markets. When a firm collaborates with a legally 
independent agent, the two parties need, as for employees within the firm, to specialize their 
human capital; the two parties need to access to the critical resource. Consequently, access 
would constitute the privileged mode of the governance of the firm built around its specific 
human capital. We argue this is true both for human capital inside and outside the legal 
boundaries of the firm. 
Second, the relationship between integration and disintegration can be formally re-examined 
on the basis of economic coordination issues. In fact, the objective of pooling the efforts of 
complementary agents involves redefining the link between integration and disintegration. 
Assets specificity always causes an economic dependency between agents. Agents are 
valuable insofar as they are working together. Yet, a risk of strategic exploitation of the 
relationship can arise from this economic dependency. In the Incomplete Contracts Theory, 
the allocation of property rights neutralizes the negative effects of the economic dependency 
by introducing a legal dependency. Ownership makes agents subordinate to each other6. Thus, 
the legal dependency or independency (which means integration or disintegration) represents 
the core of the coordinating role of productive activities. In the Incomplete Contracts Theory, 
integration and disintegration symbolize the two traditional poles of organizing economic 
activities. The focus on the human capital-intensive firm modifies the way to study the mutual 
and economic dependency between agents. The economic dependency cannot be solved by 
introducing a legal dependency because human capital cannot be legally appropriated in a 
privative way. That is why specialization, regulated by access to a critical resource, becomes 
the main coordinating tool. Besides, the issue of coordinating specialized stakeholders relates 
to agents inside and outside the firm. The coordinating role of the firm goes through its legal 
boundaries. The firm has to control relationships with its key employees, but also with its key 
suppliers, clients, subcontractors, etc. The firm coordinates the specialization of agents in the 
limits of its economic (or functional) boundaries. Therefore, integration and disintegration do 
not stand for hierarchy and market; integration and disintegration are two coordinating 
methods which differ as far as the governance of the specialization of agents is concerned. 
                                                 
6 Besides, the owner of physical assets can escape from the economic dependency. 
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They characterize two states of organizing production and coordinating the specialization of 
agents and resources by the firm (GIBBONS, BAKER AND MURPHY, 2002). 
Figure 1 illustrates this theoretical shifting in the way to explain the relationship between 
integration and disintegration. The firm is the superior institution to coordinate productive 
activities. Indeed, intra or inter-firms transactions are always coordinated by the firm. 
Contracts are not the only means to coordinate productive transactions. Coordination often 
occurs upstream the contracting scheme when the firm sets up the division of labour. 
Consequently, we do not describe the ownership of assets as an aim and a solution per se. 
Owning or not specific assets becomes integrated with a larger objective, the coordination of 
tasks which is materialized by a preliminary choice of division of labour. 
 
Figure 1 
Changing the link between integration and disintegration 
 
 
 
Third, as the coordinating role of the firm operates beyond its boundaries, it would be 
possible to exclude the notion of legal boundaries. We do not conclude to such an extreme 
interpretation. The permanent coordinating role of the firm, beyond its legal boundaries, does 
not exclude the question of the allocation of property rights. The allocation of property rights 
is not the final objective of the coordinating activity of the firm; it is rather an instrument to 
manage the specialization of agents. Actually, integration (i.e. the choice of an employment 
Complementarity 
Consequence 
Coordination 
Physical assets 
specificity 
Economic 
Dependency / Independency  
Property rights 
Institutional form 
= 
Human assets 
complementarity 
Economic dependency 
Integration Disintegration 
Coordinating mode 1 Coordinating mode 2 
/ 
 
Traditional vision focused on 
physical assets 
 
New vision focused on 
human assets 
Integration 
Tools 
Disintegration 
Tools 
Management of 
specialization 
Unique coordinating mode 
Source: Authors 
12 
 
relationship) and disintegration (i.e. the choice of a cooperation relationship) do not develop 
the same instruments to deal with the specialization of agents. In this context, for example, 
RAJAN AND ZINGALES [2001] show that the hierarchical position is an essential tool in order to 
encourage employees to specialize. Nevertheless, this kind of incentive can only affect agents 
within the firm. Incentives methods based on wages can also be developed to motivate 
workers to make specific investments. When the firm needs somebody to specialize in a 
particular and temporary task, it will ask rather for an outsider. It is actually easier to have a 
cooperation relationship with an agent not legally linked with the firm. Reciprocally, an 
external stakeholder would not fear to invest in a “useless” capital in the mid-term. The legal 
status (integration or disintegration) does not represent the core of the problem of 
coordination; the legal status of the institutional forms rather assumes an instrumental weight. 
The question of ownership only occurs in a second period, with regard to a first objective of 
productive specialization of agents. Consequently, integration and disintegration can be 
effectively distinguished on the basis of their respective capacity to regulate the specialization 
of agents. 
Lastly, such an original vision of the relationship between integration and disintegration 
opens up several research prospects. First, it is possible to find an analytical status to inter-
firms relationships. In the Transaction Costs Theory, inter-firms relationships only exist as 
hybrid forms (WILLIAMSON, 1985). In fact, the existence of inter-firms relationships is simply 
justified by the will to combine hierarchical devices and market mechanisms. Their existence 
is not properly justified. In our framework, the firm is viewed as a nexus of specific 
investments in human capital. Thus, inter-firms relationships are in keeping with the general 
need for firms to look for innovative and competitive skills non-reproducible instantaneously. 
When these skills result from a combination of human assets developed in another firm, inter-
firms relationships is the unique institutional mode of transaction. Second, we avoid analyzing 
historical movements of integration and disintegration as alternations between firm and 
market to coordinate industrial activities. We do not believe that a same productive activity 
follows, over time, fundamentally different logics of coordination. The link between 
integration and disintegration must be re-interpreted on the basis of the common objective of 
controlling the specialization of agents. Third, the notion of regulation of access gives new 
foundations to explain the current increase of inter-firms cooperations. We argue that inter-
firms cooperations stand out as an adapted way to govern the specialization of tasks in a 
context of the growing importance of human capital in the production process of firms. The 
role of firms is always to coordinate productive specialization despite institutional changes 
(from the big integrated firm to the network-firm). 
Fourth, the perimeter of the role of the firm cannot be modelled on the legal boundaries of the 
firm. Thus, the question of corporate activity must be thoroughly studied. As we focus on 
analyzing the firm built around its human capital, the ownership of assets does not delimitate 
the functional boundaries of the firm. Today, the boundaries of the firm are established in an 
organizational way by setting the limits of the activities coordinated by the firm. It is a 
question of better figuring out what the productive activity aims in order to precisely 
determine the group of agents that create value. The definition of the boundaries of the firm 
involves understanding the process of the specialization of tasks within the firm. Therefore, 
the traditional Incomplete Contracts Theory must be overcome so that one can re-examine the 
productive dimension of the firm, beyond incentives issues. 
 
 
5 Conclusion 
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Our paper re-examined the link between vertical integration and disintegration. We found that 
the nature of this link is determined by the way we define the coordinating role of the firm. 
The Incomplete Contracts Theory presents vertical disintegration as the perfect counterfactual 
to vertical integration. In this perspective, the Incomplete Contracts Theory defines the firm 
as a combination of physical assets commonly owned. The firm is only understood as an 
answer to the hold-up problem. By studying the human capital-intensive firm, we show that 
the coordinating role of the firm needs to be reconsidered. The role of the firm is not limited 
to solve the problem of the expropriation of organizational rents. In order to capture growth 
opportunities, the firm has to control complementarities between agents who realize specific 
human capital investments. In this context, the Incomplete Contracts Theory must be 
extended towards two directions: developing new mechanisms ensuring incentives alignment 
and dealing with the division of productive tasks. Actually, the division of labour must be set 
as the foundation of the problem of ensuring incentives alignment. 
This active coordinating role of the firm transforms the perception of the relationship between 
integration and disintegration. We advance that the firm ensures the division of tasks beyond 
its legal boundaries. Thus, the division of tasks concerns all agents directly employed by the 
firm but also all its key specialized stakeholders. Consequently, we conclude that integration 
and disintegration must be viewed as two different modes for the firm to coordinate the 
specialization of human assets within its economic (or functional) boundaries. In other words, 
integration and disintegration must be differentiated by the tools they give to the firm so that 
it can effectively govern the productive specialization all over its economic boundaries. 
 
 
References 
 
ALCHIAN, A. A., AND H. DEMSETZ [1972], “Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization”, American Economic Review, 62, 777-795. 
AOKI, M. [1984], The Co-operative Game Theory of the Firm, Oxford University Press − 
Clarendon Press: New York. 
ARROUS, J. [1983], “La coordination entre les firmes et à l’intérieur des firmes. Vers une 
[re]définition de l’Economie Industrielle”, in: ADEFI : Économie Industrielle : 
Problématique et Méthodologie, Economica, Paris. 
BAUDRY, B. [2004], “La question des frontières de la firme : Incitation et coordination dans la 
firme réseau", Revue Economique, 55, 247-274. 
BERLE, A. A., AND G. C. MEANS [1932]. The Modern Corporation and Private Property, 
1968, revised edition, Harcourt, Brace and World: New York. 
BHIDE, A. V. [2000], The Origin and the Evolution of New Businesses, Oxford University 
Press: New York. 
– – [1995], Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First 
Century, Brookings Institution Press: Washington, DC. 
BLAIR, M. M. [1999], “Firm-Specific Human Capital and Theories of the Firm, pp 58-90, in: 
M. M. Blair and M. J. Roe (eds), Employees and Corporate Governance, Brookings 
Institution Press: Washington, DC. 
BLAIR, M. M., AND L. A. STOUT [1999], “A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law”, 
Virginia Law Review, 85, 248-328. 
CASADESUS-MASANELL, R., AND D. F. SPULBER, [2000], “The Fable of Fisher Body”, Journal 
of Law and Economics. 43. 
CHANDLER, A. D. JR [1977], The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American 
Business, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA. 
14 
 
CHRISTENSEN, C. M., M. VERLINDEN, AND G. WESTERMAN, [2002], “Disruption, 
Disintegration and the Dissipation of Differentiability”, Industrial and Corporate 
Change, 11, 955-993. 
COASE, R. H. [1937], “The Nature of the Firm”, Economica, 4. 
– – [2000], “The acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors”, Journal of Law and 
Economics, 43, 15-31. 
FREELAND, R. F. [2000], “Creating Hold-up through Vertical Integration: Fisher Body 
Revisited”, Journal of Law and Economics, 43, 33-66. 
FRIGANT, V. [2005], “Vanishing hand versus systems integrators – Une revue de la littérature 
sur l’impact organisationnel de la modularité”, Revue d'Economie Industrielle, 109, 29-
52. 
GIBBONS, R. [2005], “Four formal[izable] theories of the firm?”, Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization, 58, 200-245. 
GIBBONS, R., G. BAKER, AND K. J. MURPHY [2002], “Relational Contracts and the Theory of 
the Firm”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 39-84. 
GROSSMAN, S. J., AND O. D. HART [1986], “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory 
of Vertical and Lateral Integration”, Journal of Political Economy, 94, 691-719. 
HALONEN-AKATWIJUKA, M. [2004], “Organizational Design, Technology and the Boundaries 
of the Firm”, Discussion Paper 02/540, University of Bristol, Department of Economics. 
HART, O. D. [1989], “An Economist's Perspective on the theory of the firm”, in: Peter J. 
Buckley and J. Michie (eds), Firms, organization and Contracts: A reader in Industrial 
Organization, Oxford University Press: New-York. 
– – [1995], Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structures, Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
HART, O. D., AND J. MOORE [1990], “Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm”, Journal of 
Political Economy, 98, 1119-1158. 
HEGE, U. [2001], “L’évaluation et le financement des start-up Internet”, Revue Economique. 
52, 291-312. 
HILLMAN, A. J., G. D KEIM, AND R. A. LUCE [2001], “Board Composition and Stakeholder 
Performance: Do Stakeholder Directors Make a Difference?”, Business and Society. 40, 
295-314. 
HOLMSTROM, B., AND S. N. KAPLAN [2001], “Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in 
the United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s”, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 15, 121-144. 
KLEIN, B. [1991], “Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: the Fisher Body – 
General Motors Relationship Revisited”, in: O. E. Williamson and S. Winter (eds), The 
Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution, and Development, Oxford University Press: 
New York 
– – [2000], “Fisher-General Motors and the Nature of the Firm”, Journal of Law and 
Economics, 43, 105-141. 
KLEIN, B., R. G CRAWFORD, AND A. A. ALCHIAN [1978], “Vertical Integration, Appropriable 
Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process”, Journal of Law and Economics, 21, 
297-326. 
LAMOREAUX, N. R., D. M. G. RAFF, AND P. TEMIN [2003], “Beyond Markets and Hierarchies: 
toward a New Synthesis of American Business History”, American Historical Review, 
108, 404-433. 
LANGLOIS, R. [2003], “The Vanishing Hand: The Changing Dynamics of Industrial 
Capitalism”, Industrial and Corporate Change, 12, 351-385. 
LEIBLEIN, M. J., AND D. J. MILLER [2003], “An Empirical Examination of Transaction-and 
Firm-level Influences on the Vertical Boundaries of the Firm”, Strategic Management 
Journal, 24, 839-859. 
15 
 
MASKIN, E., AND J. TIROLE [1999], “Two Remarks on Property-Rights Literature”, Review of 
Economic Studies, 66, 139-149. 
MINISTERE DE L’ECONOMIE DES FINANCES ET DE L’INDUSTRIE [MINEFI] [2005], “Le 
développement du capital humain dans les entreprises”, Résultats d’une enquête de 
terrain menée dans les PME par les chargés de développements industriel des DRIRE. 
décembre, 17p. 
OYER, P., AND S. SCHAEFER [2005], “Why Do Some Firms Give Stock Options to All 
Employees?: An Empirical Examination of Alternative Theories”, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 76, 99-133. 
PENROSE, E. T. [1995], The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, Oxford University Press: 
Oxford. 
PETERAF, M. A. [1993], “The Cornerstones of Competitive Advantage: a Resource-based 
View”, Strategic Management Journal, 14, 179-191. 
PRAHALAD, C. K., AND G. HAMEL [1990], “The Core Competence of the Corporation”, 
Harvard Business Review, 68, 79-91. 
PORTER LIEBESKIND, J. [2000], “Ownership, Incentives and Control in New Biotechnology 
Firms, pp. 299-333 in: M. M. Blair and T. A. Kochan (eds), The New Relationship: 
Human Capital in the American Corporation., Brookings Institution Press: Washington, 
DC. 
RAJAN, R. G., AND L. G. ZINGALES [1998], “Power in a Theory of the Firm”, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 113, 387-432. 
– – AND – – [2000], “The Governance of the New Enterprise”, pp. 201-227 in: X. VIVES 
(eds), Corporate governance: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives, Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge. 
– – AND – – [2001], “The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory of the Origins and Growth 
of Firms”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, 805-851. 
ROBERTS, J., AND E. VAN DEN STEEN [2000], “Stakeholder Interests, Human Capital 
Investment and Corporate Governance”, Working Paper 1631, Stanford Graduate 
School of Business. 
RUMELT, R. P. [1984], “Toward a Strategic Theory of the Firm”, pp. 556-570 in: R. Lamb 
(eds), Competitive Strategic Management, Prentice Hall: Englewood Cliffs, NJ. 
SESSI [2005], “Enquête sur les relations Inter-Entreprises en 2003” [ERIE]. 
WERNERFELT, B. [1984], “A Resource-Based View of the Firm”, Strategic Management 
Journal, 5, 171-180. 
WILLIAMSON, O. E. [1975], Markets and Hierarchy, Free Press: New York. 
– – [1985], The Economic Institution of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting, 
Free Press: New York. 
ZINGALES, L. G. [2000], “In Search of New Foundations”, Journal of Finance, 55, 1623-1653. 
 
 
Cécile Cézanne 
Olivier Sautel 
University of Nice – Sophia Antipolis 
GREDEG UMR 6227, CNRS, OFCE 
250, Rue Albert Einstein, 06560 Valbonne 
France 
E-mail : 
cecile.cezanne@gredeg.cnrs.fr 
olivier.sautel@gredeg.cnrs.fr 
